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Abstract 
 
De facto states, such as Somaliland (Somalia), are unrecognized separatist enclaves that 
display characteristics of statehood but lack an international legal status. To acquire domestic 
and external legitimacy, these actors engage in a wide range of governance practices: they set 
up military and police forces, executive, legislative, and judicial branches, hospitals, schools, 
banks, or social security networks. In spite of the obvious gains that can be accrued through 
the establishment of a complex governance architecture, de facto states exhibit great variation 
in the range of statelike institutions that they build: some, like Luhansk People’s Republic 
(Ukraine) put together a rudimentary governance apparatus, while others, like Transnistria 
(Moldova), manage to construct a complex system of rule. What explains the variation in 
governance practices across these separatist enclaves? Using original data on governance 
institutions across all de facto states (1945-2016), this study offers an empirical examination 
of the key factors that shape separatists’ incentives to supply governance. The findings reveal 
that de facto state separatists are less likely to provide governance when they have access to 
lootable mineral resources, but are more likely to do so when they receive external military 
support, when peacekeepers are present, when they have access to relatively immobile assets, 
when they adopt a Marxist ideology, and when they control the territory for a long time. The 
findings help us better understand the conditions under which armed nonstate actors supplant 
sovereign states as de facto authorities and successfully institutionalize their rule. 
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Introduction 
 
Before 2009, visitors traveling into northeast Sri Lanka would have come across a 
string of internal ‘border’ checkpoints that did not appear on any official map because 
they were controlled by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). From 
Kilinochchi to Trincomalee, the heavily enforced checkpoints regulated the entrance 
of people and goods into Tamil Eelam – a de facto state where Tamil separatists 
established parallel structures of governance. In 2009, the Sri Lankan army launched 
a major offensive at the end of which the LTTE was decimated and the de facto state 
vanished. Tamil Eelam is not an isolated example of a polity ruling autonomously 
over parts of a sovereign country’s territory and engaging in statelike activities. In 
fact, de facto states have been a constant presence in the post-1945 international 
environment (Florea, 2014). Some, like Northern Cyprus and Somaliland, have been 
around for several decades while others, like Donetsk People’s Republic (Ukraine) or 
Cyrenaica/Eastern Libya are more recent creations. De facto states straddle the 
territory between banditry and state building (Ahram, 2019) and conjure up two 
images: one of semi-anarchic spaces controlled by ruthless insurgents who are 
predatory and operate at the whim of great or regional powers; and another of 
functional entities that command domestic legitimacy and establish complex 
governance structures. To outsiders, de facto state actors may look like opportunistic 
warlords; to locals, they embrace the mantra of state builders who provide order, 
organize local affairs, and supplant the sovereign government as the rule-making 
authority (Pegg, 1998).  
 
What separates de facto states from other types of nonstate violence monopolists is 
their independence goal and their relative success at constructing a functional 
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apparatus of statehood. Having secured military control over a defined territory that 
legally belongs to a recognized nation-state, de facto state leaders regularly perform a 
wide range of governance activities: they set up parallel governmental and 
administrative structures, establish alternative institutions for property rights 
enforcement and dispute adjudication, engage in regularized extraction/taxation, and 
provide public goods, such as health, education, or social security services, to the 
local population. Despite coordination and enforcement costs – agreeing over and 
implementing a rule-based governance strategy is a costly undertaking – governance 
provided by separatists in de facto states yields various payoffs: it bolsters their 
legitimacy with domestic and foreign audiences (Coggins, 2014; Griffiths, 2016), 
facilitates recruitment and resource mobilization, signals commitment to local rule, 
and contributes to the internationalization of the dispute.  
 
Although the expected gains that can be accrued through the establishment of a 
governance architecture are obvious, de facto states display great variation in the 
range of statelike institutions that they build: some, like the self-declared Luhansk 
People’s Republic in Ukraine, cobble together a rudimentary apparatus of control, 
while others, like Transnistria in Moldova, manage to construct an advanced system 
of separate rule. What explains the variation in governance practices across these 
actors that share similar objectives? Why don’t all facto states build more governance 
institutions when these institutions would likely increase their domestic and 
international legitimacy, or more broadly, their claims to independent statehood? 
 
Relying on originally collected data for all de facto states during the post-WWII 
period (1945-2016), this study argues that the observed variability in governance 
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activities across breakaway enclaves is shaped by the nature of the threat environment 
in which separatists operate, the organizational structure of the separatist movement, 
and the type of resource endowments available to de facto state leaders. The article 
identifies two key factors that are expected to alter the threat environment and, thus, 
to affect separatists’ governance decisions: external military support and the presence 
of peacekeepers. External military support helps de facto state leaders maintain 
mobilization against the parent state, reduces the level of threat, and can motivate 
them to focus more extensively on governing the territory under their control. 
Peacekeepers can also critically affect separatists’ threat perceptions. While 
peacekeepers’ main role is to prevent the resumption of violence, their presence 
effectively insulates the enclave from the parent state and helps separatists cement 
their authority. The organizational structure of the insurgency – whether it is unitary 
or fragmented – is critical for the long-viability of alternative structures of 
governance. Fragmentation can divert often scarce resources towards factional 
infighting rather than the institutionalization of a governance apparatus. The 
sustainability of a functional governance system across de facto states also depends 
on the nature of resource endowments available to insurgents. In the presence of 
relatively immobile assets under their control, separatists will likely be motivated to 
engage in more extensive governance practices. However, when they have access to 
lootable mineral resources, separatists will likely be disincentivized to embark on 
governance activities. 
 
The empirical analysis provides mixed support for the theoretical expectations. 
External military support seems to only affect the establishment of certain types of 
governance institutions, specifically political institutions such as an executive, 
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legislature, or court system. The presence of peacekeepers is positively related to the 
whole range of governance institutions. Rebel movement fragmentation appears to 
affect (negatively) only the institutionalization of regularized taxation. Immobile 
assets display a positive impact on all types of governance institutions, particularly on 
political and extractive/taxation institutions. Access to expropriable mineral resources 
emerges as a strong inhibitor of institutionalized rebel rule. The results also reveal 
that governance in de facto states is likely to be more extensive when separatists 
embrace a Marxist/communist ideology and when they rule over the territory for a 
long period of time. Overall, the findings contribute to growing research on 
governance by armed nonstate actors by identifying the conditions under which these 
actors are incentivized to supply governance. More broadly, the analysis helps us 
better grasp rebels’ incentives towards organized rule vs. predation, and enhances our 
understanding of authority fragmentation in civil war. 
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. The first part provides a 
conceptual definition for rebel governance and discusses the logical underpinnings of 
governance provision across de facto states. The theoretical discussion produces a 
series of expectations that are then tested with originally collected data on all de facto 
states between 1945 and 2016. The empirical analysis is followed by an examination 
of the statistical and substantive significance of the main findings. Finally, the last 
section elaborates on the theoretical and practical importance of the key results. 
 
 
The logic of rebel governance in de facto states 
 
Rebels are conventionally viewed as violence entrepreneurs who fight against the 
state (or against internal competitors) and engage in selective or indiscriminate 
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violence against civilians (Kalyvas, 2006). Less common is the image of the rebel 
who decides to “settle down, wear a crown, and replace [internal] anarchy with 
government” (Olson, 1993: 568). While the logic of violence in civil war has received 
extensive attention, the logic of rebel governance in internal conflicts has been less 
thoroughly investigated. This is surprising given that rebel governance is fairly 
common across rebellions spanning multiple regions and time periods. The 
governance activities conducted by Latin American insurgencies, such as FARC 
(Colombia), FMLN (El Salvador), or Sendero Luminoso (Peru), are well documented 
(Arjona, 2016; Weinstein, 2007; Wickham-Crowley, 1987). There is also abundant 
information on the state building practices of various rebel movements throughout 
Africa (Mampilly, 2011; Reno, 2011), Southeast Asia (Hachim, 2013), the Middle 
East (Berti, 2015; Pearlman, 2011), or the post-Soviet space (Caspersen, 2012; Hill, 
2012; Toal, 2017).  
 
Existing studies view rebel governance through the prism of activities aimed at 
implementing collectively binding rules and providing public goods in insurgent-held 
territory (Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, 2015; Huang, 2016a). Mampilly (2011:17) 
states that a rebel organization engages in effective governance when it: (a) exercises 
a violence monopoly over an area and is able to “develop a force capable of policing 
the population” living in that area; (b) develops a dispute resolution mechanism, 
“either through a formal judicial structure or through an ad-hoc system;” and, (c) 
displays “capacity to provide other public goods beyond security.” The burgeoning 
research on rebel governance overwhelmingly concentrates on the redistributive 
aspect of insurgents’ behavioral repertoire. Current large-N and qualitative studies of 
rebel rule mainly seek to explain public goods provision in rebel-held territory and the 
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processes through which redistributive rebel activities impact conflict outcomes, such 
as duration, termination, post-war democratization, or civilian victimization (Arjona, 
2016; Florea, 2017; Heger and Jung, 2016; Huang, 2016a; Stewart, 2018). However, 
the act of ‘governing’ observed across de facto states and other armed nonstate actors 
pursuing different objectives (such as government overthrow) goes beyond 
redistribution/public goods provision and involves a broader array of institutional 
practices (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2010; Risse, 2010). With that in mind, this study 
adopts a more extensive view of rebel governance which includes the entire range of 
political, redistributive, and extractive institutions through which insurgents regulate 
social, economic, and political life in the territory under their control. 1  The 
conceptualization of rebel governance adopted herein includes the entire spectrum of 
rebel activities that are functionally equivalent to state building: political organization 
(establishing executive, legislative, or judicial institutions); redistribution (providing 
public goods); and, extraction (engaging in regularized taxation).  
 
Rebel governance practices are quite diverse. Many rebel groups engage in some form 
of regularized extraction/taxation and, thus, appropriate an important function of 
sovereign statehood. Various insurgents movements, such as the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (Natali, 2010), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (de la 
Sierra, 2020) or, more recently, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (Revkin, 2020), 
impose(d) taxes on property, incomes, export and import of goods, services, trade 
activity, vehicle and population transit, remittances, or mineral output. Other rebel 
groups, such as the Kachin Independence Army in Burma/Myanmar (Berg and Van 
Houtum, 2003) set up parallel systems of government with ministries, police and 
border forces, prisons, schools, and hospitals. Still other insurgents, such as those in 
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the Puntland region of Somalia (Nalla, 2010), developed complex legal systems and 
dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 
What is distinctive about de facto states is the expectation that they would display a 
complex governance architecture. Unlike other types of armed nonstate organizations 
who can employ governance more strategically, or more selectively, de facto state 
leaders would presumably embark on an extensive institutionalization of their rule. 
This assumption derives from two key characteristics that sets de facto states apart 
from other types of armed nonstate actors: violence monopoly/territorial control and 
the goal of independence. On the one hand, violence monopolists have rational 
incentives to become stationary in order to maximize the benefits of self-rule (Olson, 
1993). On the other hand, rebels seeking independence need to demonstrate to both 
domestic and international audiences a capacity for successful rule in order to gain 
and maintain legitimacy (Griffiths, 2016; Stewart, 2018). De facto states supplant 
sovereign governments as acting authorities over the claimed territory but their 
legitimacy ultimately depends on their ability to maintain order, administer justice, 
adjudicate disputes, provide public services (such as roads, schools, or hospitals), and 
coordinate formal or informal institutions for the organization of local affairs. 
Essentially, their legitimacy – being accepted as the rightful authority of the land – 
comes down to their ability and willingness to provide effective governance. By 
constructing a functional governance structure, de facto state leaders credibly commit 
to uphold their end of the social contract, ensure voluntary compliance with their rule, 
and signal to international audiences their capacity to organize domestic affairs and 
survive separately from the parent state.   
 
			 9 
Across many de facto states, governance is indeed deployed quite extensively. For 
instance, Somaliland, a de facto state that emerged in 1991 after the collapse of the 
Barre regime in Somalia, has gradually built the institutional architecture of a 
sovereign state. The self-declared republic has its own government, legislature, court 
systems, and police. The enclave engages in regularized taxation, provides public 
services such as health and education, conducts trade with international partners, and 
even boasts a separate central bank that issues currency (the Somaliland shilling). 
During its separate existence spanning almost three decades, the region has been more 
stable than the sovereign state it still legally belongs to (Somalia).  
 
In other cases, however, de facto state leaders have been less successful at 
implementing a functional governance system. For example, the Liberation Tigers 
(LTTE) who controlled the now defunct Tamil Eelam in Northeast Sri Lanka between 
1984 and 2009 did display a separate legal system comprising of a network of district 
courts and appeal courts. Yet, the LTTE never provided healthcare or educational 
services in the territory under its control, nor did it effectively coordinate local 
productive activities (Hashim, 2013). More recently, separatists in the self-proclaimed 
Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) in Eastern Ukraine (2014-) have been struggling to 
put together even basic structures of statehood (Toal, 2017). Nominally, LPR has its 
own government, parliament, and courts but these institutions are hardly functional: 
the government is riven by rivalry among former rebel commanders, the parliament is 
little more than a rubber-stamp assembly that convenes irregularly, and the newly 
established local courts have yet to adopt a civil code. These examples from de facto 
states across different regions and time periods illustrate bewildering variability in 
governance activities: some are quite successful at institutionalizing a statelike system 
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of self-rule while others engage in minimal governance. What might explain this 
variation? 
 
Building on the recent literature on de facto states and rebel organizational behavior, 
this study argues that de facto state leaders’ incentives to provide governance 
extensively or in a more limited way are likely shaped by the nature of the threat 
environment in which they operate, the organizational structure of the separatist 
movement, and the type of resource endowments present in the breakaway enclaves. 
The next section discusses the processes through which these factors alter separatists’ 
motivations to build more or less developed governance systems. 
 
Threat environment 
 
Although de facto states control territory and aspire to become independent, their 
existence is inherently precarious and their survival ultimately depends on their ability 
to successfully mobilize against the central government. De facto state leaders’ ability 
and willingness to institutionalize an elaborate governance apparatus will likely be 
affected by the level of threat to their violence monopoly. Where the threat to 
separatists’ violence monopoly is severe, they will be less incentivized to construct a 
sophisticated governance architecture. By contrast, where the threat to their grip on 
territory is less acute, they will likely be more invested in developing a 
comprehensive governance system. The burgeoning literature on de facto states 
(Caspersen, 2012; Florea, 2017; Keating, 2018; Lynch, 2004; Toal, 2017) suggests 
that two key factors fundamentally shape the threat environment in which they 
operate and, hence, their ability to secure a violence monopoly: the extent of external 
military support from third parties and the presence of peacekeepers on their territory.  
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External military support provided by an external patron can offer de facto state 
leaders great latitude in maintaining the mobilizational base of their movement and 
directing material resources towards governance activities (San-Akca, 2016). Foreign 
military assistance can come in different forms: small arms; communication 
technologies; logistics; military hardware; military personnel; professional trainers; 
safe havens (Byman, 2005). Enforcing order, administering justice, forming popular 
assemblies, setting up a system of regularized taxation and public administration, 
operating schools and hospitals, managing local economic affairs, cultivating 
legitimacy through symbolic practices (such as military parades or monuments 
dedicated to rebel ‘warriors’) necessitate a hefty ‘governance chest.’ Running an 
alternative government bureaucracy is an onerous task which requires substantial 
funds that are separate from those allocated for prosecuting the insurgency. External 
military assistance – especially assistance credibly offered to separatists on a regular 
basis – can facilitate the reallocation of resources towards governance activities. 
Under the protective umbrella of an external backer, separatists are likely to be more 
successful at consolidating their rule and forging a social contract with the local 
population. Hence, external military support can translate into powerful incentives to 
build governance institutions. 
 
The post-Soviet surviving de facto states – Transnistria (Moldova); Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia (Georgia); Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) – vividly illustrate the key 
role of foreign military support for the development of statelike institutions. Under the 
protection of external backers (Russia in the case of Transnistria, Abkhazia, and 
South Ossetia; Armenia in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh), all these enclaves 
managed to construct a functional statelike apparatus with political, extractive, and 
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redistributive institutions (Blakkisrud and Kolsto, 2011; Caspersen, 2012). Beyond 
the post-Soviet space, Turkey has been instrumental for the state-building process in 
Northern Cyprus (Ker-Lindsay, 2012) and, more recently, extensive military 
assistance from the UAE has been key to the development of a parallel government in 
Cyrenaica/Eastern Libya (Ahram, 2019). While external military support is expected 
to positively affect the broad governance process across de facto states, its impact on 
the types of governance institutions established by separatists is likely to be more 
variegated. Studies on state-building processes across the post-Soviet de facto states, 
for instance, suggest that military assistance from a patron state is most likely to 
influence the development of political and redistributive institutions (Caspersen 2012; 
Lynch 2004). Decisions regarding the extent of regularized taxation (extraction) seem 
to have been taken by separatists independently of external military support. 2 
Therefore, the first expectation is that external military support will positively affect 
the overall number of governance institutions, but more so political and redistributive 
institutions rather than extractive institutions. 
 
Peacekeepers present on the territory of de facto states can also critically alter the 
threat environment in which separatists operate. While peacekeepers are mainly 
introduced to prevent the resumption of violent conflict, their presence effectively 
insulates the territory from the parent state and can help separatists consolidate a 
violence monopoly. Peacekeeping operations often function as military and political 
buffers and can, thus, provide fertile ground for the establishment or consolidation of 
alternative structures of authority (Fortna, 2008). According to Beardsley, Gleditsch, 
and Lo (2015), peacekeeping operations may allow nonstate actors to bolster their 
power. Specifically, peacekeepers “may allow nonstate actors to gain strength and 
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legitimacy and thus constitute an even greater future threat to the state whether some 
form of accord is not reached” (Beardsley and Gleditsch, 2015: 67). Thus, with 
peacekeepers present, one might expect de facto leaders to be shielded from external 
threats and to direct more resources towards governance activities.  
 
Just like external military support, the impact of peacekeepers on the establishment of 
governance institutions across de facto states is unlikely to be uniform. Peacekeepers 
may open up the space for separatists to develop their political institutions and may 
directly or indirectly assist with the provision of public goods, such as security, 
hospitals, and schools. For example, the United Mission in the Sudan, UNMIS (2005-
2011), helped provide security and a space for cooperation between humanitarian 
agencies and the South Sudanese separatists regarding the provision of health and 
education services for the local population (Podder, 2014). At the same time, the 
effect of peacekeeping missions on extractive institutions might be less pronounced. 
De facto state leaders could be less incentivized to build extractive institutions when 
peacekeepers facilitate, directly or indirectly, the provision of public services such as 
security, health, and education. The data on governance institutions established by de 
facto states will be able to elucidate whether the presence of peacekeepers has varying 
effects on the types of governance institutions established by these resilient nonstate 
actors. 
 
Organizational structure of the insurgency 
 
De facto states’ organizational structure is another key factor that can impact 
separatists’ incentives to build governance institutions. The internal characteristics of 
an insurgency (whether it is cohesive/unitary or fragmented) can be an important 
source of variability in rebel governance. Intuitively, cohesive/unitary rebel 
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movements should be more successful at institutionalizing alternative orders. A 
cohesive movement typically “enjoys the organizational power to mobilize mass 
participation, enforce strategic discipline, and contain disruptive content.” By 
contrast, a fragmented movement “lacks the leadership, institutions, and collective 
purpose to coordinate and constrain its members” (Pearlman, 2011: 2). Rebel 
fragmentation is common in civil wars (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour, 2012) 
and has been found to impact various conflict processes, such as escalation from 
nonviolence to violence, the likelihood of peace settlements, or internecine violence 
(Seymour, Bakke, and Cunningham, 2016).  
 
Fragmentation can substantially impair rebels’ ability to fulfill classic functions 
associated with government. Where political or military authority within a movement 
is highly contested, valuable resources might be diverted towards factional infighting 
than towards governance provision. Conversely, when there is little contention about 
the locus of nonstate authority, rebels might be better positioned to regulate 
socioeconomic and political affairs in areas under their control. Fragmentation is 
particularly pernicious when there is no external patron to compensate for resources 
expended on internal strife. For example, fission within the rebel movement was 
undoubtedly a key driver behind the unravelling of the Chechen insurgency in 1999. 
After the rebels drove Russian troops out of the republic in August 1996, internal 
rivalries sapped the organizational strength of the insurgency. Fierce infighting 
between warlords like Shamil Basayev and Aslan Maskhadov took precedence over 
state building activities. The consequences were felt immediately: by early 1999, 
Chechnya was characterized by almost complete dismantling of institutions, “loss of 
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control over the means of violence, failure to incorporate armed groups in the state, 
and radicalization of Islamic discourse” (Zurcher, 2007: 86).  
 
Intra-movement competition can markedly shape rebels’ decision to supply 
governance. Hegemonic groups can rely on their monopolistic position to 
institutionalize a governance system, strengthen their legitimacy with the local 
population, and deter new entrants into the local marketplace of authority. 
Akcinaroglu and Tokdemir (2018) claim that, given the costs of providing 
governance, armed groups that control territory monopolistically will be more likely 
to invest in positive reputation in their communities, through the provision of goods 
and services, because the risks on their investment will be lower. By contrast, groups 
confronted with internal rivals will be less inclined, or less able, to provide 
governance. According to Metelits (2010: 12), “when an insurgent group does not 
confront competition for resources, it can more efficiently mobilize popular support, 
collecting resources and recruiting cadres to gain autonomy from the state and 
potential rivals.”  
 
All these rationales converge to suggest that fragmentation can have pernicious 
effects on separatists’ ability to build governance institutions. Yet, a functional 
disaggregation of these institutions might indicate potentially variable effects of 
fragmentation on the kinds of governance institutions constructed by separatists in de 
facto states. While a negative impact of intra-group rivalry on extractive and 
redistributive institutions is intuitive and clearly visible across recent cases (e.g. 
Cyrenaica/Eastern Libya or Luhansk People’s Republic in Ukraine), the effect of 
fragmentation on the development of political institutions is less obvious. At first 
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sight, one might expect intra-rebel rivalry to reduce insurgents’ ability to set up or 
maintain political systems, with functional executive, legislative, or judicial branches, 
for instance. Upon closer scrutiny, groups faced with multiple internal competitors, 
such as the LTTE in Sri Lanka during the 1980s, were quite adept at developing 
political institutions (Hashim, 2013). The disaggregated data on the types of 
governance institutions across de facto states will allow us to untangle the relationship 
between fragmentation and rebel governance.  
  
Resource endowments 
 
De facto states perform statelike activities inconsistently and illustrate that violence 
monopolies or shared rebel objectives are imperfect predictors of nonstate 
governance. What also seems to matter is the type of resource endowments available 
to separatists, more precisely the nature of local assets and mineral resources located 
in their territory. Where separatists control relatively immobile local assets, such as 
industrial or agricultural assets, they will likely anticipate constant revenue streams 
and will have a vested interest in becoming stationary and supporting productive 
economic activities. The assets located in rebel-held territory can drastically change 
insurgents’ approach to governance because the anticipated revenue from the 
exploitation of relatively immobile assets is likely to shift the equilibrium strategy 
from plunder to governance (de la Sierra, 2020). In the presence of immobile assets, it 
is in the best interest of separatists to limit forceful extraction and encourage 
economic activity in order to maximize taxable output (Sabates-Wheeler and 
Verwimp, 2014). To maximize extraction/taxation, though, rebel rulers have an 
encompassing interest to strike a social bargain with the local population, one that 
typically involves redistribution/public goods provision (Olson, 1993).3 Hence, asset 
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specificity is likely to directly affect rebel extraction/taxation and redistribution/public 
goods provision.  
 
In the case of de facto states, agricultural or industrial assets have typically been 
established anew by separatists after they secured territorial control or have been 
inherited from parent states after the latter lost control of the disputed enclave. 
Somaliland is an example of a de facto state with a fairly robust agricultural sector 
comprising primarily of livestock production. Livestock is crucial for the viability of 
the breakaway territory as it represents about 60% of Somaliland’s GDP and more 
than 75% of its exports (Muhumed and Yonis, 2018). An example of a de facto state 
with a well-developed industrial infrastructure inherited from the parent state is 
Transnistria, a de facto state that separated from Moldova in the aftermath of Soviet 
Union’s collapse. During the Soviet times, the bulk of Moldova’s heavy industry was 
concentrated in Transnistria. After the enclave’s de facto separation in 1991, 
Transnistrian separatists retained control over a large industrial complex. Since then, 
this industrial infrastructure has consistently generated more than half of the region’s 
GDP (Calus, 2013). Four large enterprises operate in the breakaway statelet: Moldova 
Steel Works (MSW) in Ribnita which “by 2000 was exporting production worth $150 
million annually, including $70 million to the United States” (Hill, 2012: 98) and 
which provides about 60% of Transnistria’s exports and “somewhere around 50% of 
its tax revenues” (Blakkisrud and Kolsto, 2011: 189); Cuciurgani power plant which 
provides all the enclave’s energy needs, and even meets about 50% of Moldova’s 
electricity demand;4 Ribnita cement plant which exports most of its output to Russia; 
and the Sheriff conglomerate, which owns a TV channel, textile factory, mobile 
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network, supermarket chain, modern sports complex, and gas stations throughout the 
region. 
 
Without any doubt, the Transnistrian industrial infrastructure has facilitated the 
substitution of the sovereign Moldovan government with the de facto state as the main 
actor engaged in the provision of local governance. The nature of local assets has 
enabled Transnistrian separatists to successfully construct a parallel system of 
governance. A 2004 International Crisis Group report noted that Transnistria 
“established and consolidated its own statelike structures: it has an elected president 
and parliament, a national bank that issues currency, a judicial system from the lowest 
courts up to a Constitutional Court, an army, police, militia, a strong internal security 
service, border guards and a customs service, a constitution, a national anthem, a coat 
of arms, and a flag” (ICG, 2004). Residents of breakaway statelet enjoy free 
healthcare, free education, subsidized gas and public transportation, and a flat tax rate 
of 10%. Thus, the logic discussed above, coupled with the Somaliland and 
Transnistria examples, suggest that industrial or agricultural infrastructures 
comprising relatively immobile assets can positively impact separatists’ efforts to 
establish governance institutions – especially extractive and redistributive institutions.  
 
The presence of expropriable mineral resources, such as diamonds, gold, or other 
precious gemstones, can also affect separatists’ incentives to invest in 
institutionalizing their rule. When they exert control over areas rich in mineral 
resources, insurgents have rational incentives to eschew productive activities and 
engage in predatory behavior (Beardsley and McQuinn, 2009; Haer, Faulkner, and 
Whitaker, 2019). Environments rich in lootable resources disincentivize separatists 
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from ruling extensively because access to material assets is not dependent on their 
governance strategy. Expropriable mineral endowments, such as alluvial diamonds or 
precious metals, can transform secessionist enclaves into rentier de facto states where 
revenue is generated from nonproductive activities and where local rulers derive 
greater utility from predation rather than institutionalized rule.  
 
Mineral resource endowments tend to attract opportunistic insurgents who are likely 
to be undisciplined, violent, and exploitative of the local population (Weinstein, 
2007). Rebels with access to lucrative mineral resources are maximizers of revenue 
than of social welfare. The main function of the institutions constructed by insurgents 
in resource-abundant environments is to lower the cost of operating a violence 
monopoly rather than to develop a complex apparatus of extraction, redistribution, 
and political organization. The presence of lootable mineral resources provides access 
to the material basis needed to overcome collective action problems and maintain 
mobilization against the government, and obviates the need for a social contract 
between the rebels and the population whereby the legitimacy of the former is linked 
to the provision of governance to the latter. By contrast, resource-scarce settings 
incentivize rebel groups to settle down, become “rulers of the domain,” and forge a 
social contract with civilians (Olson, 1993). Where mineral resources are meagre, 
rebels are more likely to build governance institutions in an attempt to legitimize their 
authority and secure regularized taxation. The lack of access to lootable resources 
may galvanize insurgent groups to organize “true counter-states” (Wickham-Crowley, 
1987: 487) with many trappings of statehood that allow them to monopolize activity 
in the area under their control and acquire the wherewithal necessary to survive and 
pursue their strategic objectives. Therefore, the expectation is that expropriable 
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mineral resources would correlate negatively with the extent of governance in de 
facto states: all else equal, in resource-rich environments insurgents tend to be 
predatory while in resource-scarce milieus they tend to be stationary.5 
 
While lootable mineral resources are expected to lower the likelihood of regularized 
extraction/taxation (pertaining to the broader economic activity in separatist-
controlled territories) and redistribution/public goods provision, their impact on rebel 
political institutions looks more ambiguous. On the one hand, access to lucrative 
natural endowments encourages opportunism and could foster organizationally-lean 
insurgencies. On the other hand, revenues accrued through the exploitation of mineral 
resources can help offset the costs of establishing and maintaining political 
institutions needed for the long-term viability of an insurgency, especially of one with 
a strong ideological profile. The data on the types of governance institutions built in 
de facto states is well-equipped to adjudicate between these possible scenarios. Table 
1 provides an overview of the main expectations. 
 
 
TABLE 1: Theoretical expectations (↑ positive effect; ↓ negative effect; ≡ ambiguous effect) 
 
 All governance 
institutions 
Political 
institutions 
Redistributive 
institutions 
Regularized 
taxation 
Military support ↑ ↑ ↑ ≡ 
 
Peacekeepers 
 
↑ 
 
↑ 
 
↑ 
 
≡ 
 
Fragmentation 
 
↓ 
 
≡ 
 
↓ 
 
↓ 
 
Immobile assets 
 
↑ 
 
≡ 
 
↑ 
 
↑ 
 
Mineral resources 
 
↓ 
 
≡ 
 
↓ 
 
↓ 
 
 
 
 
 
			 21 
Research Design 
 
The theoretical expectations are tested using new data on the entire population of de 
facto states between 1945 and 2016 (Florea, 2014). A de facto state is an armed 
nonstate actor that: belongs to (or is administered by) a recognized country, but is not 
a colonial possession; seeks some degree of separation from that country and has 
declared independence (or has demonstrated aspirations for independence, for 
example through a referendum or a sovereignty declaration); exerts military control 
over a territory or portions of territory inhabited by a permanent population; is not 
condoned by the government; lacks international legal sovereignty;6 exists for at least 
24 months. This definition yields a population of 40 de facto states between 1945 and 
2016 (Table 2) that experienced varying outcomes after emergence: six were 
forcefully reintegrated into their parent states; another six were peacefully 
reincorporated with some degree of autonomy; four made the transition to statehood; 
and, twenty-four were alive at the end of the observation period (2016).7  
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TABLE 2: Population of de facto states (1945-2016) 
 
De facto state Parent state Emergence Disappearance Type of disappearance 
 
Katanga Congo (DRC) 1960 1963 forceful reintegration 
Biafra Nigeria 1967 1970 forceful reintegration 
Krajina Croatia 1991 1995 forceful reintegration 
Chechnya Russia 1991 1999 forceful reintegration 
Anjouan Comoros 1997 2008 forceful reintegration 
Tamil Eelam  Sri Lanka 1984 2009 forceful reintegration 
Rwenzururu Kingdom Uganda 1963 1982 peaceful reintegration 
Gagauzia Moldova 1991 1995 peaceful reintegration 
Bougainville Papua New Guinea 1975 1997 peaceful reintegration 
Eastern Slavonia Croatia 1995 1998 peaceful reintegration 
Ajaria Georgia 1991 2004 peaceful reintegration 
Aceh Indonesia 2001 2005 peaceful reintegration 
Karen State Burma/Myanmar 1949 - alive 
Kachin State Burma/Myanmar 1961 - alive 
Taiwana China 1971 - alive 
Mindanao Philippines 1973 - alive 
TRNCb Cyprus 1974 - alive 
Western Sahara Moroccoc 1974 - alive 
Cabinda Angola 1975 -  alive 
Casamance Senegal 1982 - alive 
Abkhazia Georgia 1991 - alive 
Kurdistan Iraq 1991 -  alive 
Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan 1991 -  alive 
Puntland Somalia 1991 - alive 
Somaliland Somalia 1991 - alive 
South Ossetia Georgia 1991 - alive 
Transnistria Moldova 1991 - alive 
Republika Srpska Bosnia 1992 -  alive 
Palestine Israeld 1995 - alive 
Gaza Palestinee 2007 - alive 
Azawad Mali 2012 - alive 
Cyrenaica/East Libya Libya 2012 - alive 
Islamic State, ISIS Syriaf 2013 - alive 
Rojavag Syria 2013 - alive 
Donetskh Ukraine 2014 - alive 
Luhanski Ukraine 2014 - alive 
Eritrea Ethiopia 1964 1993 statehood 
East Timor  Indonesia 1975 2002 statehood 
Kosovoj Serbia 1998 2008 statehood 
South Sudan Sudan 1956 2011 statehood 
aTaiwan became a de facto state when China replaced it within the UN; bTurkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus; cAdministered by Morocco; dUnder Israeli occupation; eUnder Hamas control; fParent state is 
determined by the location of ISIS capital, Raqqa; gAlso known as the Democratic Federation of Northern 
Syria (DFNS); hDonetsk People’s Republic (DPR); iLuhansk People’s Republic (LPR); jNot a UN member 
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Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable captures the number of Governance institutions that a de facto 
state exhibits in any given year of its existence. Most armed nonstate actors are not 
unitary (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour, 2012) but encompass multiple factions 
that often fight with one another rather than against a common external enemy. The 
governance variable records the entire range of political, redistributive, and extractive 
institutions established by the hegemonic/dominant faction in each de facto state 
during each year of its survival period (or until December 2016 if a de facto state was 
still alive by then). Specifically, this variable is a count of the number of statelike 
institutions in each de facto state, and includes ten indicators of political, 
redistributive, and extractive institutions:8  
(1) an executive – coded as present if there is an executive authority that makes 
decisions in the de facto state (a self-proclaimed, appointed, or elected 
separatist leader who heads an executive branch that is at least minimally 
formalized through an executive office) 
(2) a legislature and/or regional council – coded as present if there is a legislative 
body and/or regional council in the de facto state capital that enacts local laws9 
(3) a court or semi-formalized legal system – coded as present if there is a formal 
or semi-formal juridical authority that adjudicates disputes between 
individuals or institutions in the de facto state 
(4) a central banking system – coded as present if the authorities in the de facto 
state establish a central banking system that functions separately from the 
parent state’s banking network or if they adopt and widely use a different 
currency 
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(5) institutions for foreign affairs – coded as present if the authorities in the de 
facto state conduct diplomacy10 by creating a foreign affairs bureaucracy, 
establishing missions abroad, and/or engaging in formal contacts with NGOs, 
IGOs, foreign governments, or other subnational entities11 
(6) media or propaganda institutions – coded as present if the authorities in the de 
facto state establish media or propaganda outlets (TV, newspapers, radio, or, 
more recently, social media presence)12 
(7) an educational system – coded as present if the de facto state authorities 
establish a system of education that functions in parallel with, or in lieu of, the 
one provided by the parent state 
(8) a welfare system – coded as present if the de facto state authorities establish a 
system of welfare (provision of healthcare and/or pensions) that replaces or 
complements the one provided by the parent state 
(9) a police and/or gendarmerie system – coded as present if the authorities in the 
de facto state establish a system of domestic control (police and/or 
gendarmerie) that operates separately from the separatist army  
(10) a civilian tax system – coded as present if there are institutions for regularized 
extraction of taxes from local civilians/businesses or from the diaspora. 
 
The mean for the governance variable is 6.43 while the median is 7 (Table 3 presents 
descriptive statistics). For instance, Transnistria (Moldova) registers a value of 7 for 
its emergence year (1991) and a value of 10 for the 1992-2011 period. Gagauzia, a 
short-lived de facto state in the same country, registers a value of 2 on this variable 
for its entire survival period (1991-1995). The dependent variable is further 
disaggregated into types of governance institutions: political institutions, a count 
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variable which includes institutions 1 through 6 (executive; legislature; courts; central 
bank; foreign affairs; media); redistributive institutions, a count variable which 
includes institutions 7 through 9 (education; welfare; police); and extractive 
institutional framework, a binary variable which captures whether a civilian tax 
system is implemented. 
 
Independent variables 
 
The first expectation postulated that foreign military assistance can markedly shape 
insurgents’ governance strategies by reducing their threat perception. The ideal 
measure for external Military support would be an estimated dollar amount of 
military assistance a de facto state gets from other countries. The covert nature of 
military interactions between de facto states and external patrons limits the 
availability of such data. To circumvent this problem, I resort to a second-best 
measurement. Specifically, I construct a proxy that captures how much external 
military assistance a de facto state gets in any given year from state sponsors (Byman 
et al., 2001; Carter, 2012; San-Akca, 2016). This variable is an index of five types of 
external military support, where each type of support is weighted equally: (1) 
weaponry and military hardware; (2) foreign military personnel; (3) foreign military 
advisors; (4) training for de facto state troops abroad; and (5) safe havens. The mean 
value for this variable is 2.77 while its median is 3. For example, Tamil Eelam 
registers a score of 4 for the 1984-1988 period when the LTTE received substantial 
support from India, and a score of 1 after 1988 when New Delhi withdrew its military 
assistance. The second expectation posited that the presence of Peacekeepers can also 
diminish separatists’ threat perceptions and spur governance activities. The presence 
of peacekeepers is captured with a binary variable, with coding based on Fortna 
(2008).13 
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The third proposition anticipated that de facto state governance could also be driven 
by the degree of Fragmentation within the separatist movement. To measure 
fragmentation within each de facto state, I look at the number of factions that make 
demands on behalf of the separatist movement (Bakke, Cunningham, and Seymour, 
2012). The higher the number of factions, the higher the level of fragmentation of the 
rebel movement. A faction is an organization that claims to represent the local 
population and makes demands regarding the status of the enclave, such as: 
reintegration into the parent state; limited autonomy; broad autonomy; no change in 
status; independence; (re)union with another state; membership in a supra-national 
entity. A faction can be a political party, military group, or civic organization that 
operates within or outside the de facto state. The fragmentation variable ranges from 1 
to 21 with a mean of 4.32 and a median of 3. Ajaria, Gagauzia, and Rwenzururu 
Kingdom are the only de facto states with a single faction throughout their entire 
existence while Palestine displays the largest number of factions – 21 at the end of the 
observation period. 
 
The fourth expectation held that fixed or relatively Immobile assets, such as an 
industrial or agricultural infrastructure, can incentivize separatists to construct a 
complex governance apparatus. In the presence of such assets, insurgents have 
rational incentives to settle down and embark on the onerous, but potentially 
rewarding, task of governing the area under their control. To gauge the impact of 
asset specificity on de facto state leaders’ incentives for greater or lesser governance, 
I rely on a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if there is an industrial (like in 
Donetsk People’s Republic, Ukraine) or agricultural (like in Somaliland) 
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infrastructure that is controlled by the hegemonic separatist group. Finally, the last 
proposition expected that expropriable mineral resources would encourage 
opportunistic rebel behavior and would correlate negatively with governance 
activities. To account for the effect of Mineral resources on the variability in statelike 
institutions across de facto states, I use a dichotomous indicator which marks the 
presence of lootable mineral resources (gold, diamonds, gems, and other precious 
metals) in these enclaves. Mineral resource data are compiled from Ross (2004), the 
U.S. Geological Survey, and the Rebel Contraband Dataset (Walsh et al., 2018). 
 
Control variables 
 
Several factors can be systematically correlated with a separatist group’s decision to 
create governance institutions as well as with the five covariates of interest. Much of 
the rebel governance process is endogenous to civil warfare. Ongoing war can 
critically shape rebel strategies regarding the institutionalization of an alternative 
system of government (Mampilly, 2011). Protracted fighting against the government, 
or against internal competitors that challenge the hegemonic faction, diverts resources 
from governance to military mobilization and exacerbates the uncertainty about the 
evolution of the conflict. Hence, ongoing conflict will likely reduce separatists’ ability 
or willingness to engage in extensive governance practices. This control variable 
marks the presence of military conflict between separatists in de facto states and the 
government, or between the hegemonic faction in the enclave and internal 
adversaries. Data on internal war are based on the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict 
Dataset where the threshold for observing warfare is at least 25 battle-related deaths.  
 
The Age of a de facto state is also expected to affect separatists’ ability to 
institutionalize an alternative system of rule. The intuition here is that older 
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breakaway territories would have had more time than younger peers to establish 
governance institutions. Additionally, the strength of the rebel group relative to the 
parent state – a proxy for the nature of the threat environment in which actors operate 
– might substantially impact incentives to become predatory or stationary. As 
Beardsley, Gleditsch, and Lo (2015: 506) suggest, governance provision could be a 
function of relative capability: stronger insurgent groups are better positioned to stay 
localized, successfully compete with parent states, and gain legitimacy through the 
provision of order and public services. Following this logic, I include an ordinal 
variable that captures the Relative capability between the separatist army and the 
government, with information from the Nonstate Actor Dataset (Cunningham, 
Gleditsch, and Salehyan, 2009).14  
 
A large body of research (Kalyvas, 2015; Mampilly, 2011; Stewart, 2018) suggests 
that, given their focus on mass-mobilization and class-based contention, 
Marxist/communist insurgencies are more likely to establish elaborate institutions of 
self-rule. As Stewart (2018) notes, these groups often create ‘people’s governments’ 
and engage in extensive public service provision. The ideological and organizational 
profile of Marxist/communist rebellions also equips them to commit more credibly to 
good governance, which is likely to facilitate civilian cooperation and reduce 
resistance to nonstate rule. To account for the effects of ideology on separatist 
governance, I include a binary variable, Ideology, which marks whether the 
hegemonic faction in each de facto state embraces Marxist/communist precepts. 
Further, rebel governance can also be influenced by the size of the local population. 
Larger populations enlarge the set of taxable assets and activities, but also increase 
demand for public goods provided by the rebels. To account for this potentially 
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confounding factor, I include a variable (logged) that captures the Population in each 
de facto state. Finally, I control for the number of states that recognize a de facto state 
during each year of its survival (Recognition). International recognition can affect 
patterns of external military support as well as the establishment of certain 
governance structures, such as an institutional architecture for the conduct of foreign 
relations. 
 
TABLE 3: Descriptive statistics 
 
 Min. Max. Median Mean St. dev. 
All governance institutions 1 10 7 6.43 3.18 
Political institutions 1 6 4 3.95 1.69 
Redistributive institutions 0 3 3 1.78 1.40 
Taxation 0 1 1 0.68 0.46 
Military support 0 5 3 2.77 1.41 
Peacekeepers 0 1 0 0.26 0.44 
Fragmentation 1 21 3 4.32 3.55 
Immobile assets 0 1 0 0.45 0.49 
Mineral resources 0 1 0 0.44 0.49 
Ongoing war 0 1 0 0.42 0.49 
Age 0.1 68 15 17.71 14.15 
Relative mil. cap. 1 4 2 2.20 0.90 
Ideology 0 1 0 0.12 0.32 
Population (log) 4 10.1 7.3 7.13 1.50 
Recognition 0 190 0 7.74 23.02 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
The empirical analysis is performed over four sets of dependent variables: a count of 
all governance institutions (Table 4); a count of political institutions (Table 5); a 
count of redistributive institutions (Table 6); the presence of a regularized system of 
taxation/extraction (Table 7). Given the nature of the dependent variables,15 auto-
correlation, and non-independence of observations (the establishment of governance 
institutions at time t+1 is unlikely to be independent of governance institutions at 
time t), I employ interval regression with robust standard errors clustered by de facto 
state to assess how the covariates impact the variability in different types of 
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governance institutions (for the binary taxation outcome, I rely on logistic 
regression).16 Interval regression is suitable for modelling outcomes with interval 
censoring where there is uncertainty about the true value of the dependent variable 
(Rabinowitz, Tsiatis, and Aragon, 1995). To guard against false positives, the coding 
protocol required at least three sources for marking the presence of each governance 
institution in every de facto state during each year of its survival period.17 Yet, as is 
the case with data collection that relies extensively on publicly available secondary 
sources (Huang, 2016a; Weidmann, 2016), completely eliminating false positives 
(governance institutions may erroneously be reported to be present) or false negatives 
(existing governance institutions may not be accurately reported) is a daunting 
undertaking. Interval regression helps address this quandary by calculating the 
corresponding probability of the outcome value lying within the designated range.18  
 
Tables 4 through 7 present the empirical results while Figure 1 depicts covariate 
effects on the predicted number of governance institutions. All variables (except for 
the age of a de facto state) are lagged one year to preserve their exogeneity vis-à-vis 
the outcome. Overall, the findings are mixed and reveal intriguing variability in the 
relationship between the main variables and outcomes. Contrary to expectations, 
external military support does not seem to have a significant effect on the overall 
number of governance institutions (Model 4). Once we disaggregate the governance 
variable, however, the picture is more nuanced: while military support remains 
insignificant for redistributive (Model 12) and extractive (Model 16) institutions, it 
displays a positive and significant effect for political institutions (Model 8). 
Specifically, for each type of external military support received by de facto states, the 
average number of political institutions increases by 0.359 (Model 8 estimates). 
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Military assistance from third party sponsors seems to reduce the uncertainty about 
maintaining mobilization against the government and facilitates the allocation of a 
greater share of resources to the development of political institutions. Under the 
protection of external backers, de facto states appear to be better equipped to establish 
themselves as strong political contenders and challenge institutionally the authority of 
parent states.  
 
As expected, the presence of peacekeepers is positively associated with state building 
activities. A de facto state that has peacekeepers on its territory manages to build, on 
average, 2.589 additional governance institutions compared to a separatist enclave 
where peacekeepers are absent (Model 4). The positive impact of peacekeepers on de 
facto state governance remains strong and statistically significant even when 
governance institutions are functionally disaggregated (Models 8, 12, and 16). These 
large and highly significant effects support the idea that, by preventing the resumption 
of hostilities and freezing the status quo, peacekeeping operations can considerably 
alter the threat environment in which separatists operate and can inadvertently 
facilitate the consolidation of nonstate actor rule. The results suggest that, at least for 
a subset of separatist struggles, peacekeeping operations may be more useful as 
conflict prevention tools than as conflict resolution mechanisms. The 
institutionalization of rebel rule in separatist enclaves where peacekeepers are present 
likely reduces insurgents’ incentives to agree to any deal that marks a departure from 
the status quo – a situation which is likely to prolong, rather than solve, the conflict. 
 
When we look at the results for all governance institutions (Model 4) the sign for 
fragmentation operates in the expected negative direction but fails to reach statistical 
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significance. Might it be that internecine rivalry within de facto states impacts certain 
kinds of governance institutions rather than others? The findings seem to support this 
suspicion. While fragmentation does not appear to affect de facto state leaders’ ability 
to build political and redistributive institutions (Models 8 and 12), it displays a strong, 
statistically significant, negative effect on rebel extraction. Model 12 in Table 7 
provides solid evidence that fragmentation severely undermines separatists’ efforts to 
engage in regularized taxation. This could be due to the fact that groups engaged in 
competition with internal rivals may lack the resources necessary to extract from the 
local population or to the fact that, faced with attempts at taxation from multiple rebel 
factions, local communities are able to mobilize more effectively and mount a 
successful resistance against rebel rule (Kaplan, 2017). Further inquiries are necessary 
to shed better light on the processes that link rebel fragmentation with rebel taxation 
in de facto states and beyond.  
 
Tables 4 through 7 indicate varying effects of resource endowments on the types of 
governance institutions built by de facto state leaders. Relatively fixed or immobile 
assets show a positive and statistically significant impact on all governance 
institutions (Model 4), but more prominently on political and extractive institutions 
(Models 8 and 16). The nature of economic assets in de facto states seems to exert a 
substantial influence on separatists’ ability to expand the range of political institutions 
and to implement effective taxation practices. Contrary to expectations, the results 
indicate that rebel control over relatively immobile assets does not necessarily 
encourage redistribution/public goods provision. This suggests that the revenues 
accrued through productive economic activities tend to be channelled towards the 
distribution of club, rather than public, goods.  
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The expectation that lootable mineral resources would correlate negatively with 
separatist governance is strongly supported. Across models with both the aggregated 
(Model 4) and disaggregated dependent variable (Models 8, 12, and 16), the sign for 
this covariate operates in the expected negative direction and conveys that the 
presence of expropriable mineral resources reduces separatists’ incentives to build 
statelike institutions. All else equal, those de facto states with lootable mineral 
resources display, on average, 2.367 fewer governance institutions compared to those 
that don’t have such resources. These patterns lend additional support to the 
conjecture that, in resource-rich environments, insurgents are less incentivized to 
invest in institutionalizing their rule (Weinstein, 2007). 
 
 
TABLE 4: Covariate effects on all governance institutions in de facto states 
 
Variable Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Military support 0.539** (0.276) 0.488* (0.265) 0.493* (0.255) 0.367 (0.251) 
Peacekeepers 2.389*** (0.559) 2.431*** (0.597) 2.304*** (0.665) 2.589*** (0.744) 
Fragmentation 0.021 (0.066) 0.016 (0.062) 0.013 (0.062) -0.058 (0.076) 
Immobile assets 1.039 (0.795) 1.144 (0.777) 1.374** (0.671) 1.524** (0.687) 
Mineral resources -2.184*** (0.837) -2.026*** (0.837) -2.254*** (0.810) -2.367*** (0.696) 
Ongoing war  -0.490 (0.638) -0.582 (0.495) -0.612 (0.484) 
Age  0.043*** (0.013) 0.057*** (0.016) 0.055*** (0.019) 
Relative mil. cap.   0.545 (0.493) 0.576 (0.439) 
Ideology   2.174*** (0.785) 2.246*** (0.802) 
Population (log)    0.242 (0.293) 
Recognition    0.016 (0.014) 
Constant 4.711*** (0.621) 4.181*** (0.859) 2.541*** (1.009) 1.217 (1.963) 
N 893 893 893 889 
Nb. of groups 40 40 40 40 
Interval regression coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto 
state (in parentheses). 
The dependent variable is number of governance institutions in de facto states. 
All covariates, except for Age, are lagged one year to maintain their exogeneity vis-à-vis the 
outcome. 
*p  < .10; **p  < .05; ***p  < .01 
 
 
 
			 34 
 
FIGURE 1: Covariate marginal effects on the types of governance institutions in de 
facto states 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: Covariate effects on political institutions in de facto states 
 
Variable Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
Military support 0.435*** (0.151) 0.417*** (0.141) 0.414*** (0.135) 0.359** (0.145) 
Peacekeepers 1.157*** (0.281) 1.102*** (0.298) 1.009*** (0.336) 1.136*** (0.404) 
Fragmentation 0.039 (0.026) 0.045 (0.027) 0.048 (0.031) 0.014 (0.033) 
Immobile assets 0.807** (0.410) 0.795** (0.384) 0.836** (0.363) 0.903** (0.403) 
Mineral resources -0.843** (0.429) -0.755* (0.453) -0.817** (0.416) -0.864** (0.375) 
Ongoing war  -0.374 (0.309) -0.374 (0.246) -0.379* (0.223) 
Age  0.015** (0.006) 0.021*** (0.007) 0.025** (0.008) 
Relative mil. cap.   0.306 (0.262) 0.321 (0.237) 
Ideology   0.753** (0.341) 0.785** (0.340) 
Population (log)    0.103 (0.153) 
Recognition    0.007 (0.006) 
Constant 2.269*** (0.384) 2.167*** (0.477) 1.320** (0.561) 0.748 (1.054) 
N 893 893 893 889 
Nb. of groups 40 40 40 40 
Interval regression coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto 
state (in parentheses). 
The dependent variable is number of political institutions in de facto states. 
All covariates, except for Age, are lagged one year to maintain their exogeneity vis-à-vis the 
outcome. 
*p  < .10; **p  < .05; ***p  < .01 
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TABLE 6: Covariate effects on redistributive institutions in de facto states 
 
Variable Model 
9 
Model 
10 
Model 
11 
Model 
12 
Military support 0.144 (0.136) 0.123 (0.137) 0.127 (0.132) 0.073 (0.128) 
Peacekeepers 0.983*** (0.262) 1.015*** (0.268) 0.969*** (0.301) 1.051*** (0.272) 
Fragmentation 0.022 (0.034) 0.019 (0.032) 0.016 (0.030) -0.015 (0.038) 
Immobile assets 0.064 (0.373) 0.118 (0.379) 0.252 (0.305) 0.345 (0.306) 
Mineral resources -0.981*** (0.370) -0.920** (0.388) -1.045*** (0.348) -1.099*** (0.298) 
Ongoing war  -0.165 (0.335) -0.225 (0.277) -0.224 (0.287) 
Age  0.018** (0.008) 0.024** (0.010) 0.024** (0.010) 
Relative mil. cap.   0.236 (0.193) 0.253 (0.176) 
Ideology   1.123*** (0.429) 1.158*** (0.438) 
Population (log)    0.084 (0.108) 
Recognition    0.008 (0.007) 
Constant 1.426*** (0.278) 1.185*** (0.386) 0.446 (0.472) -0.014 (0.816) 
N 893 893 893 889 
Nb. of groups 40 40 40 40 
Interval regression coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto 
state (in parentheses). 
The dependent variable is number of redistributive institutions in de facto states. 
All covariates, except for Age, are lagged one year to maintain their exogeneity vis-à-vis the 
outcome. 
*p  < .10; **p  < .05; ***p  < .01 
 
 
TABLE 7: Covariate effects on the presence of regularized taxation in de facto states 
 
Variable Model 
13 
Model 
14 
Model 
15 
Model 
16 
Military support -0.040 (0.181) -0.116 (0.204) -0.027 (0.229) -0.080 (0.254) 
Peacekeepers 1.794*** (0.555) 2.331*** (0.604) 2.711*** (0.636) 2.951*** (0.583) 
Fragmentation -0.207** (0.087) -0.255*** (0.087) -0.299*** (0.085) -0.340*** (0.119) 
Immobile assets 1.174* (0.700) 1.578** (0.758) 2.326*** (0.849) 2.224*** (0.830) 
Mineral resources -2.116*** (0.693) -2.227*** (0.808) -2.856*** (0.837) -3.015*** (0.922) 
Ongoing war  0.498 (0.540) 0.346 (0.535) 0.011 (0.517) 
Age  0.067*** (0.020) 0.083*** (0.018) 0.074*** (0.022) 
Relative mil. cap.   0.393 (0.507) 0.232 (0.477) 
Ideology   2.139** (0.949) 2.238** (0.968) 
Population (log)    0.375 (0.290) 
Recognition    0.002 (0.017) 
Constant 2.116*** (0.797) 0.966 (0.931) -0.435 (1.239) -2.126 (1.747) 
N 893 893 893 889 
Nb. of groups 40 40 40 40 
Logit coefficients are reported with robust standard errors clustered by de facto state (in 
parentheses). 
The dependent variable is presence of regularized taxation in de facto states. 
All covariates, except for Age, are lagged one year to maintain their exogeneity vis-à-vis the 
outcome. 
*p  < .10; **p  < .05; ***p  < .01 
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As for the control variables, a few trends are noteworthy. Ongoing war operates in the 
expected direction but fails to reach conventional standards of statistical 
significance.19 This finding is not entirely surprising since, after separating from their 
parent states, many de facto states have experienced low levels of violence with 
limited potential to completely disrupt governance processes. The military balance of 
power between parent states and separatists after the latter’s de facto separation 
coupled, in many cases, with the presence of peacekepeers function as strong 
deterrents against the resumption of violence. Under these conditions, de factor state 
leaders are able continue their state building process unencumbered. 
 
As anticipated, the Age of a de facto state positively affects observed levels of 
governance. This result is intuitive: the older a de facto state is, the more time it 
would have had to establish governance institutions. Prolonged de facto separation 
allows separatists to solidify their rule and overcome the collective action problems 
inherent in the state-building process. The sign for relative military capability 
operates in the expected direction – stronger rebels would be expected to provide 
governance more extensively than weaker rebels – but fails to achieve significance. 
Notably, this variable remains insignificant even when external military support is 
dropped from the model due to collinearity concerns.20 On the other hand, Ideology 
emerges as strong predictor of the extent of rebel governance across de facto states: 
all else equal, separatist enclaves ruled by an organization that adopts a 
Marxist/communist agenda display, on average, 2.246 additional governance 
institutions compared to those de facto states controlled by differently motivated 
groups. When we disaggregate governance institutions, we notice that, expectedly, 
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ideology’s strongest impact is on redistributive and extractive institutions (Models 12 
and 16) rather than political institutions (Model 8). These findings corroborate 
existing studies (Mampilly, 2011; Stewart, 2018) which argue that one of the 
hallmarks of Marxist/communist insurgencies is revolutionary state building – the 
construction of an apparatus of self-rule as an alternative authority structure to a 
predatory central government. Finally, neither Population nor Recognition achieve 
significance. The result for the population variable validates the observed distribution 
of governance institutions across both larger and smaller de facto states. For example, 
a comparatively high number of governance institutions can be seen both in South 
Ossetia (Georgia), with a population of approximately 50,000 people, and in 
Somaliland (Somalia), with a population of roughly 3.5 million people. The trend for 
international recognition (captured by the number of UN-member states that 
recognize a de facto state during each year of its existence) is not surprising either: 
international recognition is quite rare among de facto states (see Table 3) while 
governance activities are fairly common (hence, other factors must be driving the 
variation in outcome).  
 
Conclusion 
 
De facto states, such as Abkhazia or Northern Cyprus, are resilient separatist enclaves 
that strive to achieve independence. To bolster their domestic and international 
legitimacy, these entities embark on wide range of governance activities and 
appropriate most, if not all, functions of sovereign statehood. Despite the fact that 
successful state building efforts enhance de facto states’ legitimacy with domestic and 
international audiences and strengthen their independence claims, these armed 
nonstate actors engage in varying governance practices: some construct a fully 
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functional statelike apparatus of separate rule while others are less successful at 
governing the territory and population under their control.  
 
Relying on originally collected data for all de facto states between 1945 and 2016, 
this study argued that the variation in governance processes observed across these 
nonstate actors is driven by the nature of the threat environment in which they 
operate, the organizational structure of the movement, and the type of resource 
endowments present in the breakaway enclaves. In particular, five key factors related 
to the nature of the threat environment, rebel organizational structure, and resource 
endowments were posited to affect not just the presence but, more importantly, the 
types of governance institutions (political institutions; redistributive institutions; 
extractive institutions) established by de facto state leaders: external military support; 
peacekeepers; fragmentation within the separatist movement; the nature of local 
assets; and the availability of mineral resources.  
 
Several empirical patterns stand out. External military support from third-party 
sponsors was found to only enhance separatists’ political footprint rather than the 
broader palette of extractive and redistributive activities. By contrast, results revealed 
that the presence of international peacekeepers reduces threat perceptions and 
positively affects the whole range of governance institutions (political; redistributive; 
extractive). The organizational structure of the separatist movement (whether it is 
unitary or fragmented) does not appear to affect de facto state leaders’ ability to build 
political and redistributive institutions but has a strong, negative effect on 
extraction/taxation: the more internally split the separatist movement is, the lower the 
likelihood of observing regularized taxation in breakaway territories. As for the effect 
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of resource endowments, the presence of relatively fixed or immobile assets displays 
a positive impact on all types of governance institutions, but especially on political 
and extractive institutions. Access to expropriable mineral resources was found to 
strongly reduce incentives to build statelike institutions across the board. Finally, the 
analysis revealed that state building is likely to be more extensive when separatists 
embrace a Marxist/communist ideology and when the enclave has survived for a long 
period of time. 
 
The findings carry several implications. Thus far, the bulk of the literature on rebel 
governance has examined the influence of insurgents’ state building activities on 
various conflict outcomes, such as negotiations (Heger and Jung, 2016), civilian 
resistance against rebel rule (Arjona, 2016), or post-conflict democratization (Huang, 
2016a). With few exceptions (Arjona, 2016; Mampilly, 2011; Stewart, 2018), the 
factors that explain the variation in rebel governance itself have not been thoroughly 
investigated. This article expands our knowledge of the conditions under which rebels 
are most likely to establish complex institutions of self-rule. The study’s key 
contribution is to explain not only whether armed nonstate actors engage in 
governance but, more importantly, what kind of governance institutions they are more 
inclined to build and why. 
 
More broadly, this article contributes to ongoing debates about state building 
processes in the midst of civil warfare. De facto states are territories where two rival 
sovereigns, a legally sovereign government and an empirically sovereign rebel 
movement, compete for power and engage in a gamut of governance activities, setting 
up political, extractive, and redistributive institutions which showcase their ability to 
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rule effectively. The patterns gleaned from the empirical analysis enhance our 
understanding of authority fragmentation between state and nonstate territorial actors 
in the contemporary international system (Staniland, 2012). Large swaths of land 
across Eurasia, North Africa, or the Middle East remain under the control of rebel 
organizations that consolidate their rule through the establishment of sophisticated 
governance systems. Although in the public discourse these areas are typically 
described as being “ungoverned,” they are, in fact, “differently governed” (Clunan 
and Trinkunas, 2010; Risse, 2011). Where state authority is displaced following 
violent rebellions, internal anarchy does not automatically ensue; rather, in many civil 
war situations, nonstate territorial actors consolidate alternative structures of authority 
and, thus, pose a serious challenge to territorial statehood and sovereignty (Lemke 
and Crabtree, 2020). In the contemporary international environment, the Weberian 
state no longer holds a monopoly over the governance market (if it ever did). Instead, 
the state is joined by a plethora of “other actors, benign and malign, who sometimes 
compete...in providing governance and security” (Clunan and Trinkunas, 2010: 6). 
 
This study holds policy relevance as well. The international community is presented 
with two antithetical images of rebel governance: a ‘malign rebel governance’ image 
whereby radical insurgencies, such as the one carried out by the Islamic State of Iraq 
and al-Sham (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, secure territorial control, operate economies of 
warfare, engage in clandestine activities, forge bonds with the local population, attract 
ideologically committed recruits, and create a cauldron of instability across large 
pockets of territory; and, a ‘benign rebel governance image’ whereby moderate 
rebellions, such as the one in Iraqi Kurdistan, successfully manage local affairs and 
provide order and security in what might otherwise be an anarchic environment. 
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Devising the best policy instruments to deal with these contemporary challenges 
requires a deep appreciation of the incentives rebels have to become ‘rulers of their 
own domains.’ This study aspired to take us closer to a better understanding of those 
incentives. 
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Notes 
 																																																								
1 Rebels, insurgents, and armed nonstate actors are used interchangeably to describe 
armed nonstate organizations that employ violent or nonviolent tactics in pursuit of 
2 Such support may disincentivize separatists to engage in regularized extraction. 
Beardsley and Quinn (2009) argue that the availability of external resources reduces 
incentives for local governance: assistance from third parties creates opportunistic 
rebels who are interested in short-term private gains rather than in long-term benefits 
accrued through the establishment of a governance apparatus. 
3 This is because pure coercion encourages underproduction. As Olson (1993: 568) 
put it, “in a world of roving banditry, there is little or no incentive for anyone to 
produce or accumulate anything that may be stolen and, thus, little for bandits to 
steal.” 
4 Paradoxically, the Moldovan government purchases electricity from the separatists 
in Transnistria. 
5 I exclude oil from the range of expropriable mineral resources for two reasons. First, 
few de facto states posess(ed) substantial oil reserves on their territory (some 
exceptions are Aceh, Biafra, Chechnya, Kurdistan, and South Sudan). Second, oil is 
not an easily lootable asset as it requires an infrastructure for production and 
transport. By contrast, although mining sites for precious minerals are relatively fixed, 
their output is much more mobile than oil and, thus, easier to expropriate. 
6 International legal sovereignty refers to recognition from a simple majority of 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) permanent members plus recognition from 
a simple majority of UN members. 
7 The supplementary materials include details about data collection and the codebook 
for the de facto state dataset. 
			 48 
																																																																																																																																																														
8 Reports on the simple presence of a governance institution were not sufficient for 
coding purposes; rather, the coding process involved looking for information that the 
respective institution was functional. For example, in the early 1990s, separatists from 
Republika Srpska Krajina, a Serbian enclave in Croatia, established a ‘Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs.’ However, this institution existed primarily on paper; in practice, this 
‘Ministry’ did not have a proper office or even diplomats who could speak a foreign 
language (Caspersen, 2012). In this case, the coding did not record a functional 
institution for the conduct of foreign affairs. 
9 Where they are present, “rubber-stamp” legislatures in de facto states perform 
similar functions as parliaments in dictatorships. Separatist leaders typically establish 
these official, yet powerless, bodies to project at least a modicum of legitimacy but, 
most importantly, to neutralize internal threats to their power. 
10 According to Huang (2016b: 94), a rebel group conducts diplomacy when it 
engages in any of the following acts: (1) opens a political office abroad; (2) sends 
representatives abroad on political missions; or (3) creates a political body devoted to 
the conduct of foreign affairs. 
11 Coggins (2015: 115) makes a compelling case that rebel diplomacy is an instance 
of rebel governance as it can affect insurgents’ ability to consolidate their rule and 
provide public goods. Huang (2016b: 100-101) holds that diplomacy is a form of 
“rebelcraft” which allows rebel groups to showcase that they “are capable of 
conducting an important act – foreign affairs – that is typically understood to be the 
preserve of recognized states.” 
12 The establishment of a media system by armed nonstate actors is a manifestly 
political decision. Some de facto states, like Iraqi Kurdistan or Nagorno-Karabakh, 
have recently established a strong social media presence, especially on Twitter. 
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13 Original coding was carried out for the years not covered by Fortna (2008) 
following a similar protocol. 
14 This variable includes the following categories: 1 weaker than the government; 2 at 
parity with the government; 3 stronger than the government; 4 much stronger than the 
government. Original coding was carried out for the years not covered in the Nonstate 
Actor Dataset following a similar protocol. 
15 By construction, a de facto state can display between 0 and 10 total governance 
institutions, between 0 and 6 political institutions, and between 0 and 3 redistributive 
institutions. 
16 Alternative estimators (OLS and Tobit) produce substantively similar results. I 
provide several robustness tests in the Supplementary Materials. 
17 Coding decisions were taken very conservatively – each governance institution 
required at least three independent sources to be coded as present. Coding procedures 
are discussed in the Supplementary Materials. 
18  0 to 10 for overall number of governance institutions, 0 to 6 for political 
institutions, 0 to 3 for redistributive institutions. 
19 An exception is the negative impact of warfare on political institutions. As this 
finding is significant only at .10 level, it needs to be taken with caution. 
20 See the robustness tests in the Supplementary Materials. 
